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In recent months numerous municipal corporations, following the
pattern established by the United States Congress,' have enacted
.communist registration ordinances. Although the ordinances differ,
each has as its main objective the registration of all communist party
members within the corporate limits. The registration statement,
which is filed with the police department, usually requires the name
of the registrant, with any existing aliases, as well as any communist
organizations of which he is a member. Failure to comply subjects
the violator to fine and imprisonment.
The courts of two states' have ruled such ordinances invalid,
having found that compulsory registration of communist members
violates their privilege not to give self-incriminating testimony, since
it might subject the registrant to prosecution under existing state
criminal syndicalism statutes.' Although such registration might also
be incriminating under the Smith Act,' this would not seem to bear
upon the validity of the ordinances, a point made in the case of People
v. McCormick.' In that case the court rejected the contention of the
state that registration under a county ordinance would not be invali-
dated by its incriminating effect under a state statute because the
county of Los Angeles is not so independent of the State of California
that it could require of its citizens declarations which might be
incriminating under state law. No distinction was made in that case
between incriminating evidence which is written, as in the McCormick
case, and that which is spoken.
The privilege against self-incrimination is one carefully safe-
guarded by the Federal Constitution6 and by comparable provisions
Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
(Sept. 23, 1950) Sec. 2 (15) states: "The Communist movement in the
United States is an organization . . . awaiting and seeking to advance a
moment when . . . overthrow of the government of the United States by
force and violence may seem possible." Sec. 15, Penalties provided: "...
failure to so register or to file any such registration statement of annual
report, be punished for each such offense by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both such
fine and imprisonment."
People v. McCormick, 228 P.2d 349, (Cal. 1951); Maryland v. Perdew,
19 U.S.L.Week 2358 (Md. 1951).
' E.g. Criminal Syndicalism Act. Deering's Gen. Laws of Cal., Act 8428,
Stats. 1919, p. 281, "The term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act
is hereby defined as any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding
and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of
force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of ac-
complishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any
political change."
5 4 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1948) (Whoever know,
ingly or willfully advocates or teaches the duty of overthrowing or destroy,
ing the government of the United States or becomes or as a matter of, or
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons knowing
the purposes thereof is subject to be fined, not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years, or both).
228 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1951).
'No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. V.
NOTES
of state constitutions.' The privilege itself, however, is a vestige of
the common law and only received greater permanency through its
inclusion in the Constitution.! As literally interpreted, the constitu-
tional protection would seem to apply only in criminal actions.! How-
ever, construed in the light of common law precedents, the privilege
has been said to be available to witnesses in a civil case, where the
answer to a question might tend to incriminate the witness."
While it is well recognized that the accused in a criminal action
may refuse to take the stand by claiming his constitutional right
against self incrimination, the rule is broader than this. A witness
is protected whenever the answer subjects him to fine, imprisonment,
or prosecution, and where he can be compelled to testify.1 The
existence of compulsion is important since the privilege is waived
when the witness voluntarily testifies.'2 That the courts have zealously
protected the witness' constitutional right is well illustrated by the
decision in State v. Milam," where the court quoted with approval
from a Virginia case: "Whenever the accused . . . is forced to testify
that adverse inferences might be drawn from his failure, then he has
not volunteered as a witness and has not waived his rights. Such
waiver only follows where liberty of choice has been fully accorded.""
Since the privilege against self incrimination is predicated upon
the right of the witness not to place himself in jeopardy, it would
seem clear that the privilege does not extend to instances where the
answer to a specific question could not possibly incriminate the
witness and the questions must be answered." The witness must also
answer incriminating questions if the consequences of the incrimina-
tion are removed, as in the case of statutes granting immunity where
self incriminating testimony is reqired. The United States Supreme
Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock," decided that an immunity statute
was without force to compel testimony where the immunity was not
as broad as the privilege it attempted to replace. But in another
Supreme Court decision it was held that a federal immunity statute
is not inadequate and unconstitutional because it does not bar possible
state prosecutions. ' Thus, an alleged communist, under prosecution
for violating the Smith Act, receives little protection from a federal
immunity statute when the state has enacted a criminal syndicalism
law."
The privilege against self incrimination has not been narrowly
restricted to court proceedings. By a liberal construction of the Fifth
Amendment, the privilege has been extended to witnesses summoned
E.g., N.D. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13: "No person shall . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2252 (3d Ed. 1940).
See note 6, supra.
" McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
See May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (volun-
teered testimony made the evidence admissible at the trial of witness).
i 48 So.2d 594 (Miss. 1951).
14 Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433, 436 (1937).
'5 United States v. Greenberg, 187 F.2d 35 (1951) (being appealed).
" 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, (3d Ed. 1940), where it is stated at p. 469:
"By an immunity the offender's guilt ceases
, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
" Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (nor can a state immunity
statute prevent a prosecution of the same party by the United States).
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before grand juries, coroner's juries, and investigating committees.m
In fact, many of the more recent decisions have arisen out of grand
jury investigations where a witness is cited for contempt of court
for failing to answer a question put to him in the course of the
investigation.21 Representative of the courts' view is United States
v. Glockner, 2 where the court said: "This provision, long regarded
as one of the safeguards of civil liberty, should be, and according to
the authorities must be, applied in a broad spirit to secure to the
citizen immunity from self-accusation, and applies to all proceedings
wherein the defendant is acting as a witness in any investigation that
requires him to give testimony that might tend to show him guilty
of a crime."'
Since the decision in United States v. Burr (In re Willie),"' the
courts have followed the view" that the presiding judge ultimately
must determine the incriminatory character of the question,' The
court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of
the evidence which the witness is called upon to give, that there is
reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness if he is com-
pelled to answer." Bearing upon this point are remarks of Chief
Justice -Marshall in the Burr case which have been often quoted:
"When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider
and to decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the
witness. If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it
without violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a
direct answer to it may criminate himself, then he must be the sole
judge of what his answer would be ... If ... he say upon oath that
his answer would criminate himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact."'
Great difficulty is encountered in an attempt to distinguish
between a question which is incriminating and one which is not,
and hence when the privilege against self incrimination is available.
Professor Wigmore states that the privilege "applies:
(1) to a fact which is relevant to an inquiry whose sole or
essential object is to charge a specific crime upon the
claimant; or
(2) to a fact which forms an essential part of a crime now
desired to be charged against the claimant as a sub-
ordinate purpose in the inquiry; or
(3) though no crime is desired to be charged against the
claimant for any purpose whatever, to a fact which
would form an essential part of a crime under certain
circumstances, which circumstances for practical pur-
poses must now be deemed to be true of the claimant."'
Included in the first group are questions which directly incrim-
inate and apparently no court has required an answer to this type
of question. So too is the privilege generally available in the second
group, which includes cases revealing a material element of an
. 8 Wigmore; Evidence § 2252 (3d Ed. 1940).
21 E.g. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Alexander v. United
States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
22 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940).
2 Id. at 290.
24 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14, 269e (1807).
5 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
26 Ibid.
27 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40, No. 14, 692e (1807).
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2260, p. 356 (3d Ed. 1940).
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offense. More controversial is the application of the privilege in the
third group of cases, where in early decisions the courts have held
that a witness must answer questions which did not directly incrim-
inate or did not constitute a material link in the chain of evidence."
The modern view was first expressed in Counselman v. Hitchcock"
where the court held that an immunity statute was not coextensive
with the privilege against self incrimination since it allowed use of
testimony or evidence obtained as a result of a lead supplied by the
compelled testimony and thus the witness could not be required to
answer a question which might supply a clue which would lead to
incriminating evidence.
In order to come within the protection of the rule of the Counsel-
man case the witness must establish that there is a danger even
though the question appears harmless.31 Once this has been established
the witness need not answer. Since membership in the communist
party is not a crime per se" the question, "Are you or have you been
a member of the communist party," would not seem superficially to
be incriminating. When viewed, however, in the light of the con-
viction of the eleven top communist leaders" there would seem to be
a trend toward treating party membership and conspiracy under the
Smith Act as synonymous. This trend has been recognized by recent
decisions in the Ninth Circuit" where it has been held that newspaper
reports of communist investigations, the wide notoriety given the
conviction of the top communist officials and the findings of the
Loyalty Review Board" are sufficient to furnish grounds for affording
the privilege to witnesses questioned as to the communist party
organization and officers." A Fifth Circuit case" held that a witness
did not have to answer a question as to whether he knew if an alien
was a communist, since the witness would have to be intimately
associated with the party in order to know the alien's status. Simi-
larly the Supreme Court in another decision" resolving conflicting
Circuit Court rulings, extended the privilege against self incrimination
to a witness where admission of knowledge of the communist party
workings and of employment by the party might have furnished the
link in the chain of evidence needed for prosecution under the Smith
Act. On the basis of these precedents, the conclusion may be drawn
that the question "Are you a member of the communist Party?" must
now be considered not only a lead to incriminating evidence but
directly incriminating in and of itself. Concealment of party member-
ship appears to rest, at best, in a twilight zone between legality and
illegality; it may well constitute an important link in a chain of
2 United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (1807).
N 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
n Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920
(1951); United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940).
&2 Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1950) "There is no statute
that makes it a crime to be a member of the Communist Party
" Dennis v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 857 (U.S. 1951).
Doran v. United States, 181 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Kasinowitz V.
United States, 181 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 923
(1951); Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
" Fed. Reg. Vol., 13, No:'206, p. 6138 (Loyalty Review Board has the Com-
munist Party, U.S.A. listed under the following classifications: (1) Com-
munist; (2) Subversive; (3) Organizations which seek to alter the form
of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means).
" Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920
(1951).
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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evidence leading to conviction. It follows that the answer to a
question concerning it cannot be compelled. 9
In striking down the registration ordinances on the ground they
violate the privilege against self incrimination, the courts have not
recognized the distinction between oral testimony and written state-
ments; both possess the same incriminatory potential." It is evident
that the municipalities had resorted to a subterfuge when prior grand
jury investigations had disclosed the reluctance of witnesses in
answering questions concerning membership in the communist party."
No other result would be tenable; the ordinances could not, it is self-
evident, grant immunity from prosecution to those who would be
compelled to reveal their party affiliations, yet failure to register
would subject the individuals affected to fine and imprisonment. The
courts allow the witness the right to establish that reasonable grounds
exist for believing that the question would be incriminating,"2 while
the ordinances deny this right. Such a denial is unduly harsh when
recent convictions have demonstrated the dangers facing registrants."
Undoubtedly there are individuals who will look upon this result
as judicial protection for those who would destroy valued liberties.
It is submitted, however, that the attitude of the courts is reassuring
in the midst of an undeniable wave of popular sentiment directed
against individuals and groups holding views not in accord with those
of the more conservative elements on the national scene. The distinc-
tion between moderate liberalism, genuine native radicalism, and
communism is one which such elements often find it difficult to
make. In view of this fact, to deny the protection of the constitution
to members of any group because they hold views distasteful to
majority opinion may well be to imperil the existence of the division
of opinion on public issues which is one of the healthy features of
American democracy.
William E. Porter.
39 See note 1, supra.
Aa People v. McCormick, 228 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1951).
40 See note 34, supra.
42 Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920
(1951).
43 See note 33. supra.
